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Abstract
Traders in the financial world are assessed by the amount of money they make and, increasingly, by the amount of money
they make per unit of risk taken, a measure known as the Sharpe Ratio. Little is known about the average Sharpe Ratio
among traders, but the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests that traders, like asset managers, should not outperform the
broad market. Here we report the findings of a study conducted in the City of London which shows that a population of
experienced traders attain Sharpe Ratios significantly higher than the broad market. To explain this anomaly we examine a
surrogate marker of prenatal androgen exposure, the second-to-fourth finger length ratio (2D:4D), which has previously
been identified as predicting a trader’s long term profitability. We find that it predicts the amount of risk taken by traders
but not their Sharpe Ratios. We do, however, find that the traders’ Sharpe Ratios increase markedly with the number of
years they have traded, a result suggesting that learning plays a role in increasing the returns of traders. Our findings
present anomalous data for the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.
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Introduction
Knowing that a trader has made $10 million tells us little about
the skill involved in making this money unless we also know how
much risk was taken. If this trader could have, with equal
probability, lost $100 million then we would have to conclude that
the gain of $10 million was merely a bit of luck, even dumb luck. To
control for this possibility, trading managers and investors
increasingly look at the returns made on capital (in excess of the
risk free rate) and then divide by the standard deviation of these
returns, giving them a measure known as the Sharpe Ratio [1]. The
Sharpe Ratio plays an important role in Modern Portfolio Theory
[2,3], and in the influential Efficient Market Hypothesis [4,5,6].
According to this hypothesis market prices provide the best
estimate of asset values because they incorporate all available
information. Prices change with new information, which by its
nature arrives unexpectedly, making the markets random and
preventing anyone from consistently outperforming a broad market
such as the S&P index or the Dax, the German stock index. The
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) does not deny that investors
can, through asset allocation decisions, increase the return on their
capital, but they can do so only by increasing the amount of risk
taken, risk in this case being defined as the standard deviation of
returns. If we plot the possible rates of return against the levels of risk
needed to achieve them, we should, according to EMH (or at least
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which is the testable prediction of
EMH) find a curve that is linear with a slope equal to the Sharpe
Ratio of the broad market. EMH implies, therefore, that one can
increase one’s returns but one cannot systematically increase one’s
Sharpe Ratio above that of the broad market. We tested this
hypothesis by examining the Sharpe Ratios of a group of traders.
To do so we analysed profit and loss (P&L) statements over a 20
month period, between 2005 and 2007, for 53 traders on a trading
floor in the City of London. These traders are all male and at the
beginning of the study had an average age of 29 years. They engage
in what is variously called ‘noise’ or ‘high frequency’ trading,
meaning they buy and sell futures contracts on a range of underlying
assets, mostly bonds and equities, with the occasional position in
currencies or commodities, and hold their positions for short periods
of time, usually seconds or minutes. Their trading is proprietary,
meaning they trade for their own accounts and do not make markets
for clients; they do not therefore benefit from the bid-offer spread on
market-making, a lucrative source of profit for what are called ‘flow’
traders at investment banks; nor do they receive fees or commissions
of any kind. Lastly, they do not receive a year-end bonus based in
part on the performance of the firm as a whole. Their P&L thus
derives purely from their trading skill, and this in turn determines
their income. Selection acts quickly in this trading environment.
Money losing traders do not last long; but the more successful
traders on the floor can earn over $10million per year [7].
We calculated monthly Sharpe Ratios for this cohort of traders as
well as the broad market. To calculate a Sharpe Ratio one normally
calculates the return on invested capital, subtracts the risk-free rate of
interest to give the investment’s excess return over the risk free rate, and
divides by the standard deviation of the returns (Note S1). However,
the calculation of a Sharpe Ratio for leveraged traders, like high
frequency traders, is slightly different: high frequency traders rarely
position trades overnight so do not need to post capital, making it
difficult to calculate their rate of return. This does notmean they do not
need capital: they must have on hand capital enough to post margin on
positions and to cover any trading losses. But that capital, while
untouched, is invested in liquid deposits or government bonds and
earns on average a rate of interest close to the risk free rate, meaning
the return on this capital less the risk free rate nets close to zero [8].
Calculating the Sharpe Ratio therefore reduces to taking mean trading
P&L and dividing by the standard deviation of P&L.
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Results
We began by plotting the traders’ P&L against their risk, i.e., the
standard deviation of their P&L. We found a curve that is, in
accordance with the predictions of EMH, linear (Figure 1). We
then calculated the average monthly Sharpe Ratios for the 53
traders and found that it was 0.70.
These traders traded mostly European futures contracts, and
specifically the German market, so for comparison we calculated
the monthly Sharpe of the Dax, the German Stock index, over the
same period to give us an estimate for the broad market. Doing so
gave us a monthly Sharpe for the Dax of 0.534. We considered a
more comprehensive measure of the broad market, one averaged
from both stock and bond markets, perhaps weighted by market
capitalisation. However when we looked at the Bund market
(German government bonds), the other main market traded by our
cohort, we found that bonds were in a bear market over the
period, giving Bunds a negative Sharpe ratio of -0.03. We
therefore decided to compare the traders against the stronger of
the markets they traded – the Dax. Lastly, as our traders were
based in London, maintaining their capital and reporting their
P&L in pounds sterling, we calculated a Sharpe for the Dax with
returns denominated in sterling and found a lower figure of 0.377.
To err on the side of conservatism, we again decided for our main
statistical analyses to compare our traders against the higher of the
Dax Sharpes - the non-currency adjusted Sharpe of 0.534.
Using this figure shows us that the traders’ average Sharpe of
0.70 was higher than the broad market, although on a first pass the
difference was not significant (t-test, p = 0.13, two-tailed, n= 53.
Figure 2). We thought it unlikely that the beginner traders among
our cohort could either match or outperform the market so we
divided the sample into beginner and experienced traders,
beginners being defined as any trader who had traded for two
years or less [7]. We found that beginner traders averaged a
Sharpe Ratio of 0.39, not significantly different from that of the
Dax (t-test, p = 0.41, two-tailed, n= 27. Figure 2), although first
year traders had a negative Sharpe of -0.04. The experienced
traders, however, achieved a Sharpe of 1.02, significantly higher
than the Dax (t-test, p = 0.0001, two-tailed, n= 26. Figure 2).
We were concerned, however, that this test did not take into
account the fact that the Sharpe Ratio of the Dax is itself a random
variable which we observed at a value of 0.534 but which could, over
the study period, have been higher or lower. To control for the
stochastic nature of the Dax’s Sharpe we compared it to the trader
Sharpes by means of a bootstrap test. This test consists of the
following procedure: we use the observed time series of Dax monthly
returns over the period to create new time series of returns by
resampling. For each of these new time series we compute a Sharpe
Ratio. We can in this way create a distribution of Sharpes by
resampling the observed monthly returns of the Dax (Note S1). We
can similarly calculate new Sharpes for the traders by resampling
their monthly returns. The bootstrap test repeats this process and
measures how often the observed Dax Sharpe takes on higher values
than the average traders’ Sharpe. Our bootstrap tests confirmed our
first estimates, that the Sharpe Ratios of the beginner traders were not
significantly different from that of the Dax (p=0.72, n=27) but that
the Sharpes of experienced traders were significantly higher
(p=0.032, n=26). Running the bootstrap test for the Dax Sharpe
denominated in Sterling gives, as expected, even more significant
results (p= 0.001, n=27).
Sharpe Ratios higher than the broad market present an
anomaly for the Efficient Market Hypothesis. How can the
experienced traders in our cohort outperform the Dax? To answer
this question we began by looking at a subset of our sample,
n = 47, which had previously taken part in a study which involved
measuring a surrogate marker of pre-natal androgen exposure, the
second to fourth finger length ratio (2D:4D) [7]. A lower 2D:4D,
i.e., a longer ring relative to index finger, has been found to
correlate with higher levels of foetal testosterone [9], the
explanation for the relationship deriving, according to some
researchers, from the fact that digit growth and gonadal
development are linked by the common influence of the hoxa
and hoxd gene clusters [10,11]. In our earlier study we found that
lower 2D:4D among high frequency traders predicted higher long
term profitability and a greater number of years of survival in the
business [7]. We did not attempt to determine just how foetal
androgens affect a trader’s ability to make money, but we
suggested, based on other studies, both animal and human, that
Figure 1. P&L vs. Risk. Plot of traders’ P&L against the standard
deviation of their P&L. The curve is linear. The intercept is 0, rather than
the risk free rate, because returns are zero when the traders do not
trade. As P&L data is heavily skewed to the right, we employed a Box-
Cox transformation of the P&L to normalise it (SI). The curve is also
linear when plotted with raw and log transformed data, as predicted by
the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008036.g001
Figure 2. Trader Sharpe Ratios compared to Dax. Box plot
showing the distribution of Sharpe Ratios for all traders compared to
Sharpe Ratio of the Dax (the German Stock Index); beginner traders only
(2 yrs or less); and experienced traders only. T-test p-values indicated
below each plot. The Dax Sharpe Ratio over the period is represented as
a dashed line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008036.g002
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the androgens may increase risk preferences [12], confidence,
speed of visuo-motor scanning, or physical reactions.
In the present study we looked into the possibility that higher
pre-natal androgen exposure improved the traders’ profitability
through increased Sharpe Ratios. To conduct this and subsequent
analyses the P&L and Sharpe Ratio data were Box-Cox
transformed to correct for a pronounced right skew. The
correlation between the traders’ 2D:4D and their Sharpe Ratios,
however, while displaying the expected sign, only approached
significance at the 5% level (n = 47, r =20.26, p = 0.08). This
finding suggested to us that androgens may have their main effect
through the amount of risk taken by traders rather than through
the amount of money made per unit of risk. We therefore
employed robust regression to determine the effect on traders’
P&L of i) the standard deviation of their P&L; ii) years of
experience; and iii) 2D:4D. We found that the regression was
significant (F test, p,0.00001) and displayed high explanatory
power (R2 = 0.94). The risk variable was highly significant
(p,0.001); as was years of experience (p = 0.004); but 2D:4D
was not (p = 0.911). 2D:4D was, however, correlated with risk in a
simple regression (n= 47, r =2.43, p = 0.001. Figure 3). The low
2D:4D traders are more profitable and survive longer in the
markets, as was previously reported, but we now find the effect is
largely mediated through a higher tolerance for risk.
A high appetite for risk may seem insufficient to ensure survival
in the markets. Risk taking in high frequency trading without a
modicum of skill could just as easily result in reckless and ruinous
behaviour as it could higher returns. Perhaps the observed
longevity of high risk (low 2D:4D) traders comes merely from
our observing the results of a process that selects traders who take
large positions and who are on a lucky streak. Our sample may
therefore suffer from survivor bias. However, if this were the case,
then our data would show increasing risk with the number of years
of trading, but not increasing Sharpe Ratios. Yet our data do show
increasing Sharpe Ratios over time. When we regress the 53
traders’ Sharpe Ratios against their years of experience, once
again using robust regression on Box-Cox transformed data to
dampen outlying values, we find a highly significant relationship
(R2= 0.31, p = 0.001. Figure 4).
This result suggests either that this cohort of traders learns to
make more money per unit of risk as they gain experience [13], or
that the market selects for high Sharpe traders. If the former were
the case then over time individual traders, as they learn, would
display increasing Sharpes; while if the latter were the case then
over time traders would display static Sharpes but low Sharpe
traders would drop out of our sample. To test these two
possibilities we looked at a subset of 27 traders who shared the
same 20 months of P&L. We divided this 20 month period into
four sub-periods of five months each, calculated Sharpes for each
sub-period, and then looked at the evolution of each trader’s
Sharpe [14]. We found that between the first five month period
and the last the average Sharpe ratio increased by 0.70 (Table 1), a
result shown to be highly significant by a repeated measures
ANOVA (F(3, 78) = 4.15, p = 0.0087). Our data thus suggest that
Sharpe Ratios increase over time because traders learn to make
more money per unit of risk they take.
Discussion
The Efficient Market Hypothesis claims that traders and asset
managers cannot beat the market. Market prices move randomly
so the expected return from trying to buy low and sell high should
be zero, less transactions costs. Invested capital, on the other hand,
will on average show positive returns and these returns should
display i) a linear relationship with the investment’s risk; and ii) a
Sharpe Ratio equal to that of the broad market. We have found a
cohort of experienced high frequency traders who consistently
Figure 3. 2D:4D vs risk. Traders’ 2D:4D ratios plotted against their
risk, i.e., standard deviation of their P&L, Box-Cox transformed. The
fitted curve is quadratic. N = 53.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008036.g003
Figure 4. Sharpe Ratio and years of experience. Trader Sharpe
Ratios plotted against the number of years they have traded. Sharpe
Ratios have been box-Cox transformed. The fitted curve is logarithmic
rather than linear. N = 53.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008036.g004
Table 1. Evolution of individual Sharpe Ratios over a
20-month period.
Months Average Sharpe Average increase relative to1st 5months
1–5 0.840 0.000
6–10 1.367 0.526
11–15 1.352 0.511
16–20 1.539 0.699
Average Sharpe Ratios calculated for four subsequent periods of five months
each. Sharpe ratios increased significantly over the 20 months suggesting that
traders were learning how to make more money per unit of risk taken.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008036.t001
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make money trading the market and who attain Sharpe Ratios
higher than the Dax, their benchmark index.
The fact that these traders make any money at all trading a
supposedly random market is enough, according to some
economists, to present anomalous data for EMH. Robert Shiller,
for one, interprets EMH this way. He further claims that EMH
implies that there can be no return to intelligence, education,
training, persistence or any other trait normally associated with
success in an activity [15]. Experienced investors, therefore, should
not outperform beginners, and neither should outperform the dart
board. However, Shiller cites a study of profitable day traders on
the Taiwan Stock Exchange as evidence counting against this view
[16]. Other studies also find evidence of the persistence of trading
profits among a cohort of traders [17,18]. Harris and Schultz find
evidence that small, independent high frequency equity traders
consistently make money trading with larger and better informed
dealers; and they surmise that these traders can do so because they
keep a larger percentage of their profits, giving them greater
motivation to pay attention to small price discrepancies [17] (see
also [19]). Barber et al find evidence that successful traders make
money because they are faster at responding to information [16], a
possibility we too considered in our previous 2D:4D study when
looking at possible effects of androgens on speed of reactions [7].
These studies, as well as our own, showing the existence of
consistently profitable traders, do seem inconsistent with the claims
of EMH. However, a proponent of EMH could always counter
that the successful traders are in the same position as a coin flipper
who has just flipped 20 heads in a row – one would expect this
lucky streak to end. One could say the same about traders with
Sharpe Ratios higher than the broad market. Yet the existence of a
highly significant relationship between the traders’ years of
experience and their Sharpe Ratios suggests strongly that the
performance of this cohort of traders is not due to chance.
Furthermore, the increase over time of individual Sharpe Ratios
suggests that traders are learning to take better risks. This learning,
it should be added, could be due to both individual effort and
effective training and management on the part of the employing
firm.
The results presented here may conflict with the assumptions of
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, but they accord with common
sense. Traders are risk takers so need a high tolerance for risk, a
trait predicted by a measure of prenatal androgen exposure.
However, this trait, like height or speed in sports, may count for
little without proper training and management. In trading, as in
sports, biology needs the guiding hand of experience.
Postscript
It is common for traders and fund managers to boast high
returns and Sharpe Ratios during bull markets only to have their
excess returns disappear in the next bear market. The credit crisis
that began in 2007, just after the end of our study, put an end to
countless such claims of out-performance, with many banks and
hedge funds losing more money in 2008 than they had made in the
previous five years. We wondered if our traders had suffered the
same fate. We therefore asked the trading managers at our study
firm how their traders had performed in 2008 relative to their
average P&L between 2005–2007. The managers provided data
showing that the experienced traders remaining at the firm during
2008 (n= 22) made on average more money than they had during
the study, with many of them having record years.
In trying to account for the differing fate of traders at our study
firm, on one hand, and at many of the banks and hedge funds, on
the other, it is worth pointing out that these traders differ in one
important respect – their compensation schemes. Bankers and
hedge fund traders are awarded a yearly bonus, one amounting to
as much as 20% of P&L. Importantly, their bonus each year is
independent of previous years, meaning that a trader could in
principle make $100 million a year for four years, receive a yearly
bonus of $20 million, and on the fifth year lose $500 million and
receive no bonus. After 5 years he has lost the bank $100 million
but has pocketed a total of $80 million in bonuses and does not
have to give them back. Such a compensation scheme gives traders
a strong incentive to maximize the variance of their P&L and the
frequency of payouts. This strategy increases their chances of
being paid at what are called ‘high-water marks’, like the years
when the trader made $100 million. Such a compensation scheme,
in short, rewards risk rather than Sharpe Ratios.
It is possible, therefore, that banks and to a lesser extent hedge
funds attract traders with an appetite for large amounts of risk
rather than long term prudence. Our traders, on the other hand,
have no year end bonus; they have only profit sharing, so if they
lose money for the firm they lose it for themselves. These traders
have, therefore, a strong incentive to lower, not raise, their
variance.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
We recruited 53 male traders from a trading floor in the City of
London which employed approximately 250 traders. Recruitment
was conducted by means of an introductory note explaining that
we were looking at the effects of prenatal testosterone on the shape
of the participant’s right hand. Traders were informed that they
would receive a summary of our findings, but were not offered
payment. All subjects completed a short questionnaire asking their
age, years of trading, P&L history, number of older brothers, and
whether they had broken the index or ring finger of their right
hand. They also signed an informed consent form. All handprints,
questionnaire data, and P&L from the bank were coded by an
independent laboratory technician in Cambridge. The study was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Biological
Sciences at the University of Cambridge.
P&L Data
The employing firm provided for each trader 20 months of
monthly P&L data, net of broker commissions. P&L is recorded by
the back office accounting system so is free of reporting bias.
During the study, running from the beginning of 2005 through
autumn 2007, some traders left the firm while others joined, so for
some traders we had less than 20 months of P&L data and the
dates of their samples varied. There were, for instance, fewer
observations in 2007 than in 2005–2006. To make sure that a
difference between the average Sharpe Ratio of this sample of
traders and the market is not driven by the specific dates at which
our traders are observed, we computed the market Sharpe by
weighting the market monthly returns with the number of traders
observed each month (Note S1).
It has been reported that Sharpe Ratios can be manipulated by
traders through the use of options contracts [8]. However, the
traders at this firm could not do so because they did not position
options.
2D:4D Measurements
A subset of our traders, n = 44, took part in a previous study
looking at 2D:4D and P&L. Our procedure for measuring digit
ratio is described in Coates et al, 2009 [7].
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Statistics
The right-skew in the P&L and Sharpe Ratio data was corrected
by a Box-Cox transformation (SI). 2D:4D data approximated a
normal distribution. To dampen the effect of extreme data points
we employed either robust regression on Box-Cox transformed
variables or the more conservative bootstrap techniques applied to
raw data. Our statistical methods are more fully described in SI.
Statistical analyses were performed with Stata, release 10/SE
(Stata).
Supporting Information
Note S1 A note on trader Sharpe Ratio.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008036.s001 (0.75 MB
DOC)
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Gavin Gobby and Ed Cass for help at every stage;
Ewan Kirk, Brian Pedersen, Vik Rao, Casimir Wierzynski, John
Karabelas, Simon Taylor and Geoff Meeks for discussing the issues
involved; S. Cleary and J. Herbert for help with documentation and the
anonymizing of data; M. Codd, and O. Jones for help with the protocol;
and the traders for their patience and cooperation.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: JMC. Performed the experi-
ments: JMC. Analyzed the data: JMC LP. Wrote the paper: JMC LP.
References
1. Sharpe W (1966) Mutual fund performance. J Bus 39(S1): 119–138.
2. Markowitz H (1952) Portfolio selection. J Financ 7: 77–91.
3. Sharpe W (1964) Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under
conditions of risk. J Financ 19: 425–442.
4. Cowles A, Jones H (1937) Some a posteriori probabilities in stock market action.
Econometrica 5: 280–294.
5. Kendall M (1953) The analysis of economic time series. J Roy Stat Soc, Series A
96: 11–25.
6. Fama E (1970) Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work.
J Financ 25: 383–417.
7. Coates J, Gurnell M, Rustichini A (2009) Second-to-fourth digit ratio predicts
success among high-frequency financial traders. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 106:
623–8.
8. Goetzmann W, Ingersoll J, Spiegel M (2007) Portfolio performance manipula-
tion and manipulation-proof performance measures. Rev Fin Studies 20:
1503–1546.
9. Manning J, Scutt D, Wilson D, Lewis-Jones D (1998) 2nd to 4th digit length: A
predictor of sperm numbers and concentrations of testosterone, luteinizing
hormone and oestrogen. Hum Reprod 13: 3000–3004.
10. Kondo T, Zakany J, Innis W, Duboule D (1997) Of fingers, toes, and penises.
Nature 390: 29.
11. Paul S, Kato B, Cherkas L, Andrew T, Spector T (2006) Heritability of the
second to fourth digit ratio (2d:4d): A twin study. Twin Res Hum Genet 9:
215–219.
12. Apicella C, Dreber A, Campbell B, Gray P, Hoffman M, et al. (2008)
Testosterone and financial risk preferences. Evol Hum Behav 29: 384–390.
13. Camerer C (1997) Taxi Drivers and Beauty Contests. Engineering and Science
1: 10–19.
14. This analysis was suggested to us by Ed Cass, head of capital markets at the
Canada Pension Plan.
15. Shiller R (2005) Irrational Exuberance. 2nd Ed. Princeton: Princeton University
Press. 312 p.
16. Barber B, Lee Y, Liu Y, Odean T (2004) Do individual day traders make
money? Evidence from Taiwan. May 2004. Available: http://faculty.haas.
berkeley.edu/odean/papers/Day%20Traders/Day%20Trade%20040330.pdf.
17. Harris J, Schultz P (1998) The trading profits of SOES bandits. J Financ Econ
50: 39–62.
18. Garvey R, Murphy A (2005) Entry, exit and trading profits: A look at the trading
strategies of a proprietary trading team. J Emp Financ 12: 629–649.
19. Sanford J, Grossman S, Stiglitz J (1980) On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets. The Am Econ Rev 70 (1980): 393–408.
A Note on Trader Sharpe Ratios
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 November 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 11 | e8036
